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The Exilic Will to Criticism
Said's concern with humanism as a viable praxis executed in the service of culturally relevant and, indeed, necessary forms of criticism, gives rise to his occasional reservations about Foucault's theoretical project, whose 'circularity,' he fears, leaves little if any room for individual resistance and will. 3 In contrast, much of his work serves not merely to delineate, catalogue, and archive various régimes du savoir as part of an impersonal network of power relations and anonymous discourse, but to 'reveal the dialectic between individual text or writer and the complex collective formation to which his work is a contribution' (Said 1979, 24) . In such projects, Said shows himself to be far less interested in the deconstruction of culture through critical thought than he is, as we will see, in the reconstruction of humanistic values through critical engagement with the world. To this end, he holds up the model of Auerbach to demonstrate how an intellectual must not only unearth cultural artifacts through the reading of texts, but also transform those historical fragments, through an act of synthetic interpretation, into both an artillery for resistance and a tool kit for reparation of the cultural machine. It is in the exercise of a personal 'interpretive art' enabling such cultural recuperation and synthesis that Said brings his own worldly and historical situation, his humanism, and his exilic subjectivity and agency into dialogue with his intellectual forebear. * * * * * Perhaps the most appropriate starting point for an inquiry into the nature of Said's transhistorical dialogue with Auerbach is his 1969 translation of the latter's essay, Philology and Weltliteratur, first published seventeen years earlier. As Said points out in his preface, the title of this essay suggests the intersection of humanism and historicism in the domain of comparative literary studies. Auerbach alludes to the 3 Despite his admittedly large debt to Foucault, Said does not hesitate to critique and revise the more cynical aspects of the latter's thought, particularly those emphasizing the inevitable determinism of social life. The divergence of Said's thought from Foucault's theory of authorless production and circulation of knowledge, for instance, is evident throughout his writings; even in as early a text as Orientalism, he affirms that an 'otherwise anonymous collective body of texts constituting a discursive formation like Orientalism' nonetheless carries the determining imprint of individual writers (1979, 23 Goethean ideal of a 'world literature' which aims to give expression the common goals and aspirations of humanity, tying this vision to the pedagogical orientation of German Romance philology, whose rigorous methodologies inaugurated the practice of historicism (Auerbach 1969, 1) . In this vein, Auerbach advocates a historicist humanism that seeks to penetrate and evaluate Weltliteratur so that an 'inner history…of mankind achieving self-expression'-what he calls 'our Myth'-could be written (4-5). However, Auerbach is also very much aware of his own historical moment as 'a period of conclusive change' faced with a 'mighty and rapid' process of leveling and concentration that imposes uniformity upon cultures. Though admitting that the new circumstances have made it more difficult than ever to engage meaningfully in a critical activity whose goal is to trace man's 'advance to consciousness of his human condition and to the realization of his given potential' (5),
Auerbach does not believe that such humanistic aims have become altogether superfluous in the modern age. Thus, he argues, while such goals should by no means be abandoned, their priority must nonetheless be reconsidered.
When an 'ahistorical system of education' not only threatens to impoverish society but also 'lays claim to dominating us' (6), the philologist's first duty, Auerbach writes, is to counter its representations by revealing our historical contingency and by demonstrating that the history of the present moment determines not only who we are, but also what we can become. Auerbach writes that the Goethean concept of Weltliteratur and its philology, with its vision of 'a spiritual exchange between peoples' (6) is no longer tenable in the modern environment; that any such exchange between cultures not already bound together politically would have little effect on culture or on the 'reconciliation of peoples' as such. In light of these changes, the goal of philology can no longer be a spiritual aim of 'designating man's place in the universe,' but only a secular and social one of making men conscious in their own history (16) (17) .
Advocating this new conception of Weltliteratur as the 'diverse background of a common fate,' and accepting the standardization of world culture as an inevitable fact, allowance for emergent movements, and none for revolutions, counter-hegemony, or historical blocks' (Said Auerbach holds that the philologist should facilitate a cultural dialogue between two partners brought together 'in the terminal phases of their fruitful multiplicity,' through political developments. The philologist should render and articulate precisely the 'fateful coalescence' of those two cultures in such a way that the story of their merging will become 'their myth' (7). This account, if anything like the universal, spiritual 'Myth' Auerbach describes earlier in the essay, would also relate 'the research of reality which fills and rules our life' (4).
For the most part, Auerbach remains reticent in his scholarly work about strictly political concerns. Still, the fact that he was a Jewish exile from Germany writing from which we stem and in which we participate, a definition of our present situation and also perhaps of the possibilities for the immediate future' (quoted in Green 1982, 12) . However, stipulating that such an insight could be gained only in the most favorable of circumstances, he goes on to describe not these current-day and future political ramifications of the historical process, but rather a personal reflexivity and self-refinement to which philological criticism gives rise and which, he seems to believe, is its only certain function: 'In any event, such a method compels us to look within ourselves and to set forth our consciousness of ourselves here and now, in all its wealth and limitations' (12). Thus, although Auerbach acknowledges the broader humanistic import of philology and designates the critic's work as a task specific to his time, his theoretical reflections do not carry the explicit claim of political agency that we will find, one generation later, in the work of his greatest admirer and champion. produces 'non-coercive knowledge in the interests of human freedom' (Said 1983, 15) .
Putting into practice this concept of 'secular criticism' in his essays, Said 'affirms the connection between texts and the existential actualities of human life, politics, societies, and events.' It is precisely such 'realities of power and authority-as well as the resistances offered by men, women, and social movements' that, he claims, 'make texts possible, deliver them to their readers, [and] solicit the attention of critics' (5).
Indebted as he is (despite their differences) to Foucault, Said also holds that any claims about the universal, spiritual value of cultural production and consumption are invalid differentiate not only between itself and its 'outside' but also between that which is or is not valuable within itself. Discriminating both within and beyond its domain, the hegemonic culture appropriates 'the entire matrix of meanings we associate with 'home,' belonging, and community' (11). In light of these observations, Said not only resists and challenges a cultural system of values which dominates from above and saturates downward to the material base of society but, in his resistance also refuses the proprietary process involved in 'belonging to' a culture or assuming a cultural identity.
It is in the context of this political materiality of culture that he lays out his schema of the possibilities of resistance and agency for the worldly-situated intellectual who engages in secular criticism.
Said notes that 'in the transmission and persistence of a culture, there is a continual process of reinforcement.' That is, because all forms of discourse rely on the authority of culture, the expression of opinions from a position of power and the translation of those opinions into political acts tend merely to 'validate the culture to itself.' The dominant culture assumes greater authority through its associations with national identity and the state, through its institutions or 'external forms and assertions of itself,'
and most importantly, through its 'vindicated power as victor over everything not itself.' Consequently, the state and the related ideological apparatuses to which the power of culture is assimilated, 'tend to be successful in enforcing their hegemony ' (13-14) . But, Said points out, in spite of this rather depressing state of affairs-or perhaps because of it-resistance to cultural pressures by individuals and groups, has been present from time immemorial.
Said provides Macaulay's Minute of 1835 as an example of a case or cultural precedent by which 'superiority and power are lodged in a rhetoric of belonging, or being 'at home'… and in a rhetoric of administration' (13). In showing how an individual can exploit and re-interpret the authority of culture so as to justify an act of colonial subjugation, Said locates agency in an act of reading (Macaulay's expressing his 'opinion') situated strategically and instrumentally within the rhetorical power of culture (a locus where 'opinion' translates into a 'decision' to act). However, Said implies that this agency is not restricted solely to imperialists whose power derives from the hegemonic culture, its nationalist discourse, and its rhetoric of belonging and 'home.' Rather, the performative speech act, when uttered by any 'individual consciousness placed at a sensitive nodal point' (15) Said is intent on showing that the exile's critical recovery of this cultural mythos or 'home' is not only a personal recuperation-a psychic repairing of one's own fractured self-consciousness-but indeed a concrete political act: an infinitesimal but still meaningful restructuring and reconstruction of the fragmented world. He stresses that the critical consciousness is an isolated voice out of place in its social world 'but very much of that place' and of the literal body it inhabits. Standing for a 'professedly universal or humane set of values' it is 'not by any means an escape' from the world. (Said 1983, 15-16) . However, the oppositional critic must straddle the line between inside and outside, metropolis and periphery and refuse all binding affiliations that would limit his or her ability to move freely between the two spaces.
He elaborates on the political potential of this 'ascetic code of willed homelessness' in rather specific terms. Far from being restricted to the physically displaced, the exilic perspective depends more on a degree of intellectual ex-centricity acquired through historical knowledge and humanistic learning. Such a 'worldly self-situating' enables 'a sensitive response to the dominant culture' whereby the individual consciousness can introduce 'circumstance and distinction where there had only been conformity and belonging' (15). The individual who stands at a critical distance from the culture troubles the 'quasi-religious authority of being comfortably at home among one's people, supported by known powers and acceptable values, protected against the outside world' (16). In this way, the exilic mode, as JanMohamed points out, is an ambiguous border crossing and a constant shifting back and forth, that elucidates 'the politics of cultural construction of subjects and how the latter can begin to break free from their indigenous formation' (JanMohamed 1992, 99).
We may couch this notion of exile as a tactical position in neo-Foucauldian language:
The intellectual 'subject' of the cultural system depends for his authority upon the power relations governing its regimes du savoir-depends on them even in his opposition to them, in order to be heard as a legitimate dispenser of new knowledge.
That is, since the sphere of knowledge to which the intellectual speaks is constituted by the power of culture, any claims falling outside of it would lack authority: Said understands that were he to locate himself definitively outside of this dominant culture, his position would appear, by definition, illegitimate. Thus, by refusing to assume any positive identity in his opposition, by refusing to define himself in any terms other than that of an 'ironic' difference 6 from the hegemony itself, he remains within the sphere of recognized power and does not forfeit his authority. He can thus mediate, contrapuntally, between the outside and the inside, the metropolis and the periphery, the hegemonic and the subaltern. As Robbins points out, exile in this sense becomes an inversion and redefinition of authority that entails 'a recomposition of cultural capital'
(34) and a redistribution of knowledge in the economy of cultural resources.
Still, if Said views exile at the political level, as a potential site of creativity and cultural re-appropriation, he never doubts that at the level of personal experience, it is little more than a 'condition of terminal loss' (Said 2002a, 173 (Said 1983, 16) , and by critiquing the resultant affiliative modes by which we respond to such filiative loss. In doing so, he offers a response to the critical imperative Auerbach outlines in 'Philology and Weltliteratur': a call for the philologist/critic to trace, preserve, and indeed shapethrough interpretation-the 'inner dream' of mankind as a spectacular production of our historical unraveling. Auerbach's sense of urgency in this regard is clear:
The loss of such a spectacle-whose appearance is thoroughly dependent on presentation and interpretation-would be an impoverishment for which there can be no possible compensation. To be sure, only those who have not totally sustained this loss would be aware of privation. Even so, we must do everything within our power to prevent so grievous a loss (Auerbach 1969, 5) .
Thus, the fear Auerbach articulates here in terms of the loss of this inner dream, Said addresses in terms of another kind of loss: namely that of exile. Indeed, he suggests that the only way to avoid losing this 'spectacle' of our historical becoming is, ironically, to approach it from our own inherent-though largely unacknowledged or disavowedcondition of exile in the modern world.
Said elaborates this notion of exile as a uniquely modern critical orientation within a schema of dispossession, mourning, and palliative reparation of 'home': the exilic Thus, as an alternative to impossible natural relationships, affiliations substitute social bonds for generational family ties and thus 'preserve the human race… making certain that human history continues by repeating itself according to a certain fixed course of events' (Said 1983, 112) . At the same time, such affiliations allow for intellectual freedom and enable originality, which according to Said is a type of loss in its primal sense (133). Indeed, it is the cooperation between filiation and affiliation, Said asserts, that lies at the heart of critical consciousness (16). The example of Auerbach demonstrates this point: By substituting a relationship of affiliation with the cultural history of Europe for his destroyed sense of filiation with the modern nation of Germany, Auerbach recovered the inner dream of his lost world and reconstituted it as a 7 In his essay, 'On Repetition,' Said makes this point explicit by giving the example of sexual desire and its thwarting by institutions: 'Intentionally, in an unmediated and wholly natural way, filiation gives rise not only to conflict but is driven by a desire to exterminate what has been engendered, the abandonment of offspring. Unintentionally however, [as a result of affiliative constructs], the opposite takes place: marriage as an institution is established, offspring and parents become bound by it' (118).
modern-day 'myth'-an interpretation ascribing causal meanings and imparting historical, or at least aesthetic, coherence to a traumatic experience or event. Auerbach's filiative loss and the affiliative alternative he adopted enabled his unique interpretive synthesis: the construction of a narrative relating the 'fateful coalescence' of the worlds and peoples he saw to be approaching the end of their 'fruitful multiplicity.' Directing his critical will to tracing historical processes and sketching patterns without advancing any rigid, totalizing theory, Auerbach could produce a dialectical, dramatic narrative (as opposed to a static vision) of European civilization.
* * * * * But why is now the time for us to reconsider and learn from the example of Auerbach's Mimesis? Because while affiliation remains the most viable alternative to conceiving human relationships in the modern world, it has also come to pose major problems to the socio-cultural order. Said points out that as natural bonds and forms of authority become transpersonal, affiliation comes to resemble a cultural system with its own hierarchy and totalizing world-view, and 'the process reproduces the filiative discipline supposedly transcended' (Said 1983, 21) . In other words, 'for the first time the compensatory affiliative relationships interpreted during the academic course of study in the Western university actually exclude more than they include' (21). This degradation is evidenced by two trends: the critic's coalition with the hegemony of Culture (in the guise of traditional humanism) on one hand, and his betrothal to philosophical, theoretical systems on the other. Both critical systems merely duplicate the tightly knit family structure that secures generational hierarchical relationships and 'succumb to the inherently representative and reproductive relationship between a dominant culture and the domain it rules' (24). With its alliance to cultural dogma that expresses a 'barely sublimated' ethnocentrism and nationalism, and with its ahistorical retreat into textuality, criticism merely perpetuates a 'quasi-religious quietism.' In other words, it becomes 'unworldly.'
In this vein, Said warns us of the irrelevance of criticism to modern social, cultural, and political experience, the danger of its 'enormous complaisance' in both its public (Auerbach 1953, 16) . Consequently, a method of interpretation which sees everything that happens in the world as an element in the narrative structure of universal history, could claim absolute authority and spread to other traditions: 'Interpretation in a determined direction becomes a general method of comprehending reality' (16). This idea, the Ansatspunkt, as it seems, of Auerbach's philological undertaking, has further implications: that cultural development is intricately tied to schematic hermeneutical conceptions or 'readings'; and that more importantly, it is bound to a general critical will. In other words, Auerbach shows how a particular style of representation evolved in response to an existing will to interpretation-one which sought to make immanent the meanings it believed latent in worldly history. Thus, the concept of figura was in essence Auerbach's re-reading of a history of interpretation as represented in realistic literature.
Auerbach writes that the 'order and the interpretation of life' is to be discerned in the thoughts, consciousness, and 'in a more concealed form,' in the words and actions of individuals:
For there is always going on within us a process of formulation and interpretation whose subject matter is our own self. We are constantly endeavoring to give meaning and order to our lives in the past, the present, and the future, to our surroundings, the world in which we live; with the result that our lives appear in our own conception as total entitities-which to be sure are always changing…. (Auerbach 1953, 549) .
The overlapping, complementing, and contradictions of such formulations of the world 'yield something that we might call a synthesized cosmic view or at least a challenge to the reader's will to interpretive synthesis' (Auerbach 1953, 549) . Though subject to revision and expansion, such an act of interpretive synthesis reflects one's unique critical style and is in this sense a 'personal art' in its own right: a product of personal intuition which carries nonetheless the possibility of 'centrifugal radiation' from the 'circumscribed set of phenomena' it comprehends (Auerbach 1969, 15) . It is in this way that the critic writes a history-from-within against a broader background-a myth that is at once enduring, unified, and perhaps even universal.
It is this emphasis on interpretation in Auerbach's philology that seems to have influenced Said most as he undertook his own readings of 'Western' history and culture. My interest in Auerbach's method… unlocked the system of correspondences between history and literature that is the cornerstone of a whole tradition regarding temporality as both the repository of human experience… as well as the mode of understanding by which historical reality can be comprehended (Said 2002b, 457) .
But while Auerbach's philological activity was based on a temporal approach, Said affirms that a hermeneutical technique mapping the movements and migrations of representational discourse-a literary topography-is now equally necessary. That is, the 'system of correspondences' Said describes above can be gleaned through an interpretive mode of mediating time or-and this becomes the emphasis of exilic criticism-a mode of mediating space. Indeed, though an interpretive discipline grounded in temporality is still essential, in the age of globalization, spatiality must be regarded as a substantial 'repository of human experience' and hermeneutical mode by which we can comprehend historical reality as well.
* * * * * Said opens his 'Introduction' to the fiftieth-anniversary edition of Mimesis with the following quote from Gabriel Garcia Marquez:
…human beings are not born once and for all on the day their mothers give birth to them, but that life obliges them to give birth to themselves.
This epigraph in many ways summarizes the intersection of Said's reading of Auerbach, his concept of filiation and affiliation, and his notion of exilic criticism. It suggests that writing, both creative and critical, is a perpetual accouchement-a 'kind of self-making within the context of the specific dynamics of society at a very precise moment in its development' (Said 2003, xiii) . For Said, Auerbach serves as a model of the critic situated psychologically and intersubjectively in the world, who like Said himself, enacts the personal drama of being expelled from 'home' and of his endless quest to make a new home for himself-or rather, to remake himself within the rented space of his writing-through cultural critique. It is thus that the relationship of Said, the readercritic, with Auerbach's text and indeed with Auerbach-as-text becomes a 'sympathetic dialogue of two spirits across ages and cultures' (xiv).
Within this transhistorical exchange, the dialectical shifting in cultural space between filiative and affiliative processes that Said delineates in modern culture is comparableand in many ways a response-to the backwards and forwards oscillation of literary representations in historical time that Auerbach plots in Mimesis. Said sees these representations as the mediatory methods and optics through which individuals, situated in a particular cultural space and historical moment, view and articulate reality.
Moreover, he asserts, whether they take the form of creative writings or interpretive readings, they play an important role in shaping human history and society:
